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Abstract
With the rapid growth of sharing economy, there has
been a bitter controversy on the disruptive nature of
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry. This
study examines the impact of ride-sharing services,
which is one of the most successful business models in
sharing economy, on taxi industry. Using
comprehensive data on Uber and taxi transactions in
New York City from April to September 2014, we find
that ride-sharing is negatively associated with the
demand for taxis. Interestingly, this effect is contingent
upon market- and customer-segments. The negative
effect of Uber on taxis is mostly driven in Manhattan
and high-income areas, where most taxis are
concentrated. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that
ride-sharing services take more demand of taxi
customers who pay by cash and who are price-sensitive,
by providing relative advantages of ride-sharing
platforms. In addition, taxi customers in groups appear
to more switch to ride-sharing services. Relevant
implications for both research and practice are
discussed.

1. Introduction
Sharing economy has received notable attention in
the last few years, and information technology (IT)enabled sharing platforms have rapidly expanded.
According to the research of PwC [37], sharing
economy grows more than 30% annually, and it is
expected that the scale of sharing economy would reach
the scale of traditional economy sectors in 2025. By
virtue of its dominance in the global market, ridesharing has recently come to the forefront of the debate
on sharing economy. Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber”
hereafter), the world’s largest ride-sharing platform,
rapidly expanded at an unprecedented scale.
With the rapid growth of sharing economy, there has
been a growing debate on the disruptive nature of the
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry [13].
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The disruptive force of the sharing economy has raised
challenges for incumbent industries as well as policy
makers. Zervas et al. [50] suggest that the 10% increase
of Airbnb listing leads to the 0.39% decrease in hotel
revenue. In particular, as one of the most successful
business models in sharing economy, the questions
about the societal impacts of ride-sharing on taxi
industry are part of a larger debate over regulation of
sharing economy [33].
Despite their enormous societal impacts, there is
surprisingly little systematic evidence on the
relationship between ride-sharing and taxi industry.
Although many detractors and regulators in major cities
have raised concerns on cannibalization of taxi demand
by the ride-sharing services, the narrative about the
competition between ride-sharing services and taxis is
largely anecdotal. Thus, we have limited understanding
of how the increased usages of ride-sharing platforms
affect the demand for taxis. To bridge this gap, this
study aims at answering the research questions: (1)
Whether and how much does ride-sharing impact the
demand for taxis? (2) If so, which customers does ridesharing take from the taxi industry?
It is noteworthy that the effects of IT-enabled new
services and business models on conventional ones have
been widely covered in the information systems (IS)
literature, though these effects are not always negative.
For instance, Ghose et al. [21] repute a widespread
concern that IT-enabled used-product market will
significantly cannibalize new product sales, as
mentioning that “this proposition, while theoretically
possible, is based on speculation as opposed to empirical
evidence.” Danaher et al. [14] also suggest that digital
distribution channels are poor substitutes for physical
sales. Hence, quantifying the impact of ride-sharing on
taxi industry is important not only for practitioners and
policy makers, but also for researchers.
Figure 1 shows the trends in Uber and taxi
transactions in NYC over the period April to September,
2014. The usage of Uber has doubled during 6 months,
whereas transactions of taxis have decreased by
approximately 5%. However, as neither controlling for
important region- and time-specific heterogeneity nor
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reflecting an appropriate econometric model for the
interplay between Uber and taxis, these patterns of Uber
and taxis leave it ambiguous whether the demand
change for taxis can be attributable to the growth of ridesharing.

Figure 1. Trends in Uber and taxi pickups in NYC

To examine the impact of ride-sharing on taxi
industry, we use fine-grained datasets on Uber and taxi
pickup transactions in New York City (NYC) for the
period April to September 2014 with over 800,000 zip
code-hour level observations. As our identification
strategy, we employ three-stage least squares (3SLS)
regression model to estimate a simultaneous interaction
between taxi and Uber, enabling us to address a
potential simultaneous bias. Further, we explore the
contingent effects depending on market- and customersegments to provide deeper understanding of how ridesharing services compete with taxis.
Our findings demonstrate that Uber and taxi are
directly competing with each other in NYC, as
consistent with a conventional view. The 10% increase
in the number of Uber pickups leads to the 0.12%
decrease in the number of overall taxi pickups in NYC,
at all reasonable levels of significance. What is most
striking, though, is that the effect of Uber on taxi
demand is contingent upon market- and customersegments. The negative effect of Uber on taxis is mainly
driven in Manhattan and high-income areas, where most
taxis are concentrated. Furthermore, our analyses reveal
that ride-sharing services take more demand of taxi
customers who pay by cash and who are price-sensitive,
by providing relative advantages of ride-sharing
platforms. In addition, taxi customers in groups appear
to more switch to ride-sharing services.
This paper offers the following key contributions.
First, this is the first study to quantify and provide
systematic evidence on the impact of ride-sharing on
taxi market, using a large-scale dataset and an
appropriate econometric model. This study extends the
evidence of the sharing economy’s disruptive nature
into the ride-sharing, though we document distinct
effects of Uber on taxi demand by region and income

level. Notably, given that ride-sharing has grown more
rapidly in outer boroughs and low-income areas (see
Figure 3), our findings highlight the critical role of ridesharing in expanding transportation options for the
markets underserved by taxis, while not cannibalizing
the taxi demand.
Second, we differentiate various types of taxi
customers and find that the Uber’s impact is different
depending on customer-segments. In practical terms,
this study provides managerial implications that ridesharing companies need a target marketing strategy to
effectively capture customer demands depending on
customer-segments and spatiotemporal characteristics.
In addition, our findings are also encouraging for taxi
industry because all markets are not cannibalized by
ride-sharing services.

2. Literature Review
In the IS literature, a large stream of studies covers
the competition between IT-enabled new services and
conventional (offline) ones. For instance, prior literature
has paid attention to whether digital goods and digitally
distributed contents cannibalize the demand for physical
goods [14, 43]. In addition, many studies investigate
how the emergence of electronic commerce can affect
brick-and-mortar stores [4, 7, 8]. In the literature, ITenabled services and business models are not always
substitutes for conventional ones, rather their effects
have been reported as insignificant or even positive,
expanding the market without cannibalization for
conventional services [14, 21].
In line with this literature, there is a bitter
controversy over the disruptive nature of IT-enabled
sharing economy to threaten traditional industry which
is mainly based on offline businesses. Zervas et al. [50]
provide the first systematic evidence of how sharing
economy competes with traditional industry in the case
of Airbnb and hotel industry. Using a city-month level
difference-in-difference setting, they empirically
investigate the impact of Airbnb’s entry on hotel
industry, arguing that the 10% increase of Airbnb listing
affect the 0.39% decrease in hotel revenue.
Surprisingly, however, there is little systematic
empirical evidence on the relationship between ridesharing and taxi industry, which is one of the most
successful business models in sharing economy. In the
absence of rigorous empirical evidence, there are a
number of mixed opinions in the industry about the
effect of ride-sharing on taxi demand. FiveThirtyEight,
an Internet media, compares the frequency of monthly
taxi pickups in NYC between 2014 and 2015, arguing
that Uber is taking millions of Manhattan rides away
from taxis [18]. The Economist [45] also suggests that
the average price for NYC’s medallions has fallen from
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one million dollars in 2014 to 0.7 million dollars in 2015.
However, they claim that “attributing these woes to
Uber is difficult,” given that Uber is not taxis’ only new
source of competition because the NYC introduced boro
taxis and bicycle-sharing systems in 2013. In addition,
not all Uber passengers would otherwise have hopped in
a cab. Rayle et al. [39] suggest that 39% of their survey
participants said that they would have used a taxi if ridesharing services were not available.
However, previous studies have several notable
limitations to be addressed in this study. First, these
studies mostly rely on aggregate level data, such as city
and month level. These results should be suffered from
aggregation problems and confounding effects.
Especially, the spatial-temporal variation of taxi and
Uber is more evident than other markets such as
accommodation. To the extent that there may be
variation in the effects depending on region and time,
understating these spatiotemporal effects and isolating
the magnitude of them are important in assessing the
ride-sharing effects. Thus, our granular level data on trip
record for Uber and taxis in NYC allow us to exploit
spatiotemporal variations of Uber and taxi transactions,
and further investigate the distinct effects of ridesharing by region and time.
Second, assessing and quantifying the causal effects
of ride-sharing on taxi demand poses an empirical
challenge due to endogeneity, making identification
difficult. For instance, Wallsten [48] presents the
evidence of the relationship between Uber’s popularity
and the decline of consumer complaints per trip about
taxis in NYC, possibly due to taking away taxi’s
customers or improving taxis’ service in response to the
new competition. However, the author also mentions
that “the data do not make it possible to derive the
magnitude of the effects of Uber.” Quantifying the
impact of ride-sharing on taxi industry is essential to
provide implications for practitioners and policy makers,
given that it has been subject to much debate among
them. Hence, with granular level datasets and an
appropriate econometric technique, this study attempts
to quantify the impact of ride-sharing on taxi industry.

3. Hypothesis Development
3.1. Competition between ride-sharing and taxi
According to the framework of competitor analysis
[9], the degree of competition is determined by market
commonality and resource similarity. Given that ridesharing and taxi provide similar riding services for
customers, it is reasonable to conjecture that the
increased usages of ride-sharing platforms would reduce
the demand for taxis.

Furthermore, the disruptive power of ride-sharing
stems from the characteristics of online platforms. ITenabled platforms could dramatically lower search costs
[3] and facilitate buyer-seller match, leading to a
frictionless market [8]. Contrary to taxi services, ridesharing platforms facilitate to seamlessly connect
customers to the nearest driver when they request a ride.
Reduced search costs could allow people to hire more
ride-sharing drivers. In addition, people would be more
likely to use ride-sharing platforms because the ridesharing services offer a significant price reduction over
traditional taxis (e.g., UberX) and are quite easy to use
and useful; otherwise they would be unlikely to do [22].
We thus propose the following hypothesis to be
empirically tested as a baseline:
Hypothesis 1. Ride-sharing services will be
negatively associated with the demand for taxis.

3.2. Contingent effects of market segments
The mixed opinions of ride-sharing’s impacts on taxi
industry may be attributed to not only the absence of
empirical evidence, but also its contingency depending
on market- and customer-related factors. The inherent
feature of online platforms to reduce search costs can
influence the market commonality, and consequently
the degree of competition between ride-sharing services
and taxis. In the taxi market, search costs are substantial
not only for customers as buyers, but also for drivers as
sellers. Patron relies on stochastic discovery of a taxi by
standing on the street. Taxi drivers get around to search
for uncertain, potential customers across the city if not
arranged by calls in advance. Due to high search costs,
taxi drivers tend to be concentrated spatially in
downtown and temporally during the daytime or rush
hour, making customer’s search costs higher in the taxisparse areas and time. Hence, the costs for searching taxi
and ride-sharing services will be low enough to easily
get both in the taxi-dense areas. Cramer and Krueger [12]
find that the capacity utilization rates of taxi and Uber
drivers are much more similar in NYC than in other
cities. The authors suggest that the high population
density of NYC supports more efficient matching of
taxis and passengers through street hailing than is the
case in other cities. While they do not separate out
Manhattan from outer boroughs in NYC, their argument
is valid only in Manhattan where most taxis are
concentrated (more than 90%).
On the other hand, contrary to taxi services, ridesharing platforms could reduce driver’s search costs, as
well as customers’ ones, through seamless driver-rider
match. Ride-sharing platforms facilitate to seamlessly
connect customers to the nearest driver when they
request a ride. Using a simulation approach in
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estimating a dynamic general equilibrium model of the
taxi market in NYC in 2011-2012, Frechette et al. [19]
argue that it was estimated to reduce the search time for
taxis by 9.3 percent if assuming that drivers knew the
location of the closest passengers, as the case of ridesharing platforms. Reduced drivers’ search costs
increases expected payoffs from driving in the suburbs
of the city, leading to a broader services provision.
Figure 2 highlights different geographical patterns of
taxi and Uber in NYC. The study of University of
California Transportation Center [39] suggests that wait
times of on-demand ride services are markedly shorter
and more consistent that those of taxis in San Francisco.
In addition, 30% of respondents in their survey said that
short wait time is the reason why they chose ride-sharing,
which is the second highest.

Figure 2. Uber and taxi pickups in NYC
Notes: We plot 150,000 random sample from yellow taxi pickups and
50,000 from boro taxi transactions during April 2014. Uber pickups are
plotted based on 200,000 random sample during April 2014.

In the taxi-sparse areas, search costs for taxi will be
higher than those for ride-sharing, making ride-sharing
and Uber serve different types of customers by their
marginal values for search costs. On the other hand, in
the taxi-dense areas, market commonality is high and
customers would treat the services of ride-sharing and
taxi similarly, making the competition more intensive.
According to Chen [9], the competition intensifies when
market commonality is high; thus, logically, we expect
that the impact of ride-sharing on taxis will be greater in
the taxi-dense areas than taxi-sparse areas. This is
largely consistent with Brynjolfsson et al. [7], who
suggest that the competition between the Internet
retailers and brick-and-mortar is much more intensive
when selling famous products than niche products
which consumers have a difficulty in finding in a
traditional offline market.
For a goal of empirical testing, we operationalize the
taxi-dense areas as Manhattan in NYC and high-income
areas. As shown in Figure 2, taxi availability depends on
boroughs in NYC. In addition, many studies suggest that
low-income areas are underserved markets by
traditional transportation such as taxi, and Uber has the
potential to expand transportation option there. Using a
controlled study in low-income neighborhoods in Los

Angeles, Smart et al. [42] show that an app-summoned
UberX arrives in less than half the time of a telephonedispatched taxi, and more reliable with no wait time
exceeding 30 minutes. Meyer [34] show that Uber are
expanding transportation options in low-income areas in
NYC. Therefore, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ride-sharing services on
taxi demand will be greater in Manhattan than outer
boroughs in NYC.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of ride-sharing services on
taxi demand will be greater in high-income
neighborhoods than low-income neighborhoods.

3.3. Contingent effects of customer segments
Consumers face non-negligible costs of switching
between different services for a new kind of services or
technologies. In particular, access to IT or smartphones
may be proffered as a barrier to widespread adoption of
new ride-sharing services. Given that taxis are operating
across cities before the introduction of ride-sharing
services, the switching costs may play a critical role in
the competition between them. The lower the switching
costs for ride-sharing are, the more ride-sharing will
reduce the taxi demand.
In this study, we propose two factors which could
influence customers’ switching behavior and
subsequently the competition between new sharing
economy platforms and traditional industry: relative
advantage and perceived risks. Relative advantage
refers to the degree to which consumers regard an
alternative service to be superior to the conventional
service, and it receives tremendous attentions as one of
the factors to facilitate innovation adoption and
diffusion [2, 40]. As consumers perceive more
advantage and usefulness a service or product offers,
they tend to more adopt and expect more investment in
learning the service or product [15, 25]. Huang and
Hsieh [24] suggest that relative advantage directly
affects the switching costs and their acceptance behavior.
Thus, we expect that perceived relative advantage may
influence the switching behavior of taxi customers to
new ride-sharing services.
The ride-sharing services have been embraced, in
part, because it is cashless and its fare is automatically
charged to rider’s credit card after rolling up to
destination. Cashless exchange systems make it easy for
the users to pay seamlessly. Of many features of ITenabled ride-sharing platforms, ease of payment was the
most attractive reasons to use ride-sharing (35% of
survey respondents), according to a survey of Rayle et
al. [39]. Furthermore, Uber maintains its policy that
“tips are not included on Uber’s platforms, and that
tipping is neither expected nor required” [35], making
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Uber more attractive to the price-sensitive customers
who are not willing to pay large tips. As a form of price
discrimination, tipping allows some customers to pay
less than others for the same service, and price-sensitive
customers are willing to reduce the total cost of services
by leaving smaller tips [23, 32]. In this regard, we expect
that taxi customers who pay by cash and price-sensitive
customers who give a smaller tip percentage (i.e.,
percentage of total fare) will perceive higher relative
advantage of ride-sharing over taxi, as there’s no riffling
through wallet for small bills or tips. Therefore, we
propose the following:
Hypothesis 4. Ride-sharing services will reduce the
demand for taxi customers paying by cash more than
those paying by credit card.
Hypothesis 5. Ride-sharing services will reduce the
demand for taxi customers giving a small tip
percentage more than those giving a large tip
percentage.
In addition, there are implicit switching costs
associated with decision biases and risk aversion [10].
People who have never used, or have little used a new
service feel risk toward the new service. This type of
risk is originated from the uncertainties about the
service, and it deters risk-averse consumers from
switching to and accepting new service or technology.
In the context of peer-to-peer (P2P)-based sharing
economy, functional and physical risk may play a key
role in the adoption of the new services because its
supplier is not firms but individuals. Therefore, people
who are not familiar with ride-sharing services may
perceive risk for safety and uncertainty for its utility.
Decision on technology adoption is made
collectively by the group through a process of
communication and negotiation [41], and social
influence can act as an antecedent to technology
adoption [46]. There is an extensive social psychology
literature addressing group versus individual decision
making [26]. In particular, previous studies suggest that
people made a decision in group tend to be more risktaking than people made a decision alone [44, 47]. Dion
et al. [16] propose four possible explanations for making
riskier decision in a group: diffusion of responsibility,
persuasion, familiarization, and cultural value. That is,
they share their risk with other people in the group [17].
Gardner and Steinberg [20] suggest that when in peer
groups than alone, the experiment participants took
more risks and focused more on the benefits than costs
of risky behavior. In addition, peer influence affects an
user’s switching intention in social network services [49]
and increases the impulsive purchasing [31].

Taken together, to the extent that the perceived risk
or uncertainty acts as switching costs for ride-sharing
services, group customers will be more favorable
toward new technology or services, than individual
consumers. Thus, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 6. Ride-sharing services will reduce the
demand for taxi customers in group more than those
alone.

4. Methodology
4.1. Data
In this study, we employ zip code-hour level panel
data on Uber and taxi pickup transactions in NYC over
the period from April to September 2014. NYC provides
an ideal setting for our study because Uber has been
active there since May 2011, and NYC is today one of
its biggest and most controversial markets. As of 2015,
Lyft provided only 7% of rides summoned over the
Internet in NYC, compared with Uber’s 90% [6]. In
addition, while yellow cabs still make 10 times more
trips than Uber cars in the city, more Uber cars were on
the road than yellow taxis in NYC in 2015 [36]. This
sample period also rules out the possibility of
competitors’ influences (such as Lyft) because Uber was
the market-dominating company in NYC before 2015.
FiveThirtyEight obtained the Uber transaction data
from the from NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission
(TLC) by submitting a Freedom of Information Law
request. This dataset contains over 4.5 million Uber
pickups in NYC from April to September 2014.
Additionally, we use data on approximately 90 million
taxi pickup transactions for this period from the official
NYC TLC trip records. Each individual trip record
contains precise location coordinates and timestamps
for where and when the trip started.
Uber and taxi pickup locations are specified in their
latitude and longitude to four decimal places. To convert
their locations into zip code level, we match the latitude
and longitude to the corresponding zip code, using a
geographical information systems software. Data that
returned null values or zip codes outside NYC are
dropped. Our final panel dataset includes 191 zip codes,
and consequently 838,872 zip code-hour observations.
It is worth noting that TLC also provides information on
various attributes of taxi transactions in NYC, allowing
us to segment customer types. The TLC trip record
dataset includes transaction information about fare, tip
amount, number of passenger, and payment method.
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in our
datasets.

Page 660

Table 1. Summary statistics (N = 838,872)
Variables

Mean

Std. dev

Min

Max

Description

Uber

5.04

19.11

0

434

Number of Uber pickup transactions

Taxi

102.17

267.34

0

3,290

Number of taxi pickup transactions

Taxi_Large tip

52.14

130.78

0

1,770

Number of taxi transactions whose tip percentage is above median
(median = 9.5%)

Taxi_Small tip

50.00

139.46

0

1,743

Number of taxi transactions whose tip percentage is below median
(median = 9.5%)

Taxi_Group ride

29.07

81.36

0

1,113

Number of taxi transactions whose number of passenger is two or
more

Taxi_Single ride

73.10

187.53

0

2,321

Number of taxi transactions whose number of passenger is one

Taxi_Cash

44.07

111.20

0

1,603

Number of taxi transactions whose payment method is cash

Taxi_Card

57.29

157.67

0

1,936

Number of taxi transactions whose payment method is credit card

4.2. Empirical model
Assessing the causal relationship between Uber and
taxis poses an empirical challenge due to endogeneity.
There are several potential sources of endogeneity that
may lead to biased estimation. Firstly, there would be
omitted variables that will potentially affect the demand
for both Uber and taxis. Another potential source of
endogeneity could be reverse causality or simultaneity
bias because taxis and Uber interplay with each other.
That is, taxi may affect the demand of Uber, as well as
Uber influences the demand for taxis.
To address the potential endogeneity problems, we
employ 3SLS model, which combines two-stage least
squares (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR). The 3SLS approach estimates the full system of
equations where endogenous variables in an equation
are used as explanatory variables in other equations. It
is widely adopted when dealing with endogeneity and
contemporaneous cross-equation correlation between
error terms [27, 29]. In particular, this approach is
recommended to model a triangular structural
relationship [28], allowing us to consider the
simultaneous interaction between Uber and taxis.
Specifically, we estimate the system of equations:
ln 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽11 ln 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21 ln 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝛽𝛽31 ln 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−168 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1

ln 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽12 ln 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22 ln 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝛽𝛽32 ln 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−168 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2

where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is zip code-specific effects invariant over time,
𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 is time-specific effects common across regions, and
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error in zip code i in time t. The variables
of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , which are the frequency of pickup
transactions of Uber and taxi, are log-transformed to
mitigate negative skewness of its distribution, after
adding one to account for zero values. We are primarily
interested in 𝛽𝛽11 , which represents the percentage
change in taxi transactions associated with one percent
increase in Uber transactions.

In addition, we include 168 hours (one week) lagged
term as instrument variables. The instruments should be
correlated with the endogenous regressor but
uncorrelated with the dependent variable through any
channel other than their effects via the endogenous
regressor. Since there is much fluctuation in taxi and
Uber transactions depending on day-of-week and timeof-day, we believe that the demand for transportation
before a week is more appropriate instruments for the
current demand.
Our model also allows for the dynamic nature of
Uber and taxi pickups by including variables for lagged
frequency of pickups between two successive hours.
The current frequency of taxi and Uber pickups can be
correlated with the past pickups in two opposite ways.
On one hand, previous taxi pickups may reduce the
probability of street hailing in the next hour. On the
other hand, the demand for taxis and Uber can be
concentrated in specific time periods, such as rush hour.
In this case, the current taxi pickups will be positively
correlated with the past pickup transactions.
Furthermore, we can deal with time-series specific
effects such as autocorrelation in the demand for taxis
and Uber by including one hour lagged term of the
dependent variables [1].
Unobserved local conditions such as geographical
(e.g., tourist attractions), demographic (e.g., race,
gender) and socioeconomic factors (e.g., income) may
have heterogeneous effects on both Uber and taxi
demands. To account for region-specific effects, zip
code dummies are included. In addition, we also include
date (183 days) and time-of-day (24 hours) dummies to
control for time-specific transportation demands or
unobserved factors (e.g., events).

5. Results
5.1. Impact of Uber on taxi demand
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To examine whether and how the frequency of Uber
transactions affects the demand for taxis, we estimate
the empirical model using our full sample of 838,872 zip
code-hour observations, which pools 191 zip codes in
NYC over six months in 2014. Table 2 reports our
estimation results of the simultaneous competition
between Uber and taxis. Each column in the table
corresponds to a different regression.
Table 2. Results of 3SLS estimation
Main Effect
(H1)

DV:
ln(Uber)

Borough
(H2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

ln(Taxi)

ln(Taxi)

ln(Taxi)

-0.0120***

-0.0007

(0.0007)

(0.0011)
(0.0010)

-0.0063***

ln(Uber) ⨯
Middle-income

ln(Taxi) (t-1)
ln(Taxi) (t-168)
DV:
ln(Taxi)

(0.0013)
-0.0168***
(0.0012)
0.379***

0.378***

0.383***

(0.000959)

(0.000962)

(0.000958)

0.421***

0.421***

0.414***

(0.000958)

(0.000958)

(0.000962)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

-0.0311***

0.0074***

0.0129***

(0.0018)

(0.0022)

(0.0012)

-0.0566***

ln(Taxi) ⨯
Manhattan

(0.0018)
-0.0144***

ln(Taxi) ⨯
Middle-income
ln(Taxi) ⨯
High-income
ln(Uber) (t-1)
ln(Uber) (t-168)

0.0002
(0.0013)

-0.0145***

ln(Uber) ⨯
Manhattan

ln(Uber) ⨯
High-income

Income
(H3)

(0.0017)
-0.0789***
(0.0022)
0.447***

0.446***

0.445***

(0.000792)

(0.000792)

(0.000791)

0.478***

0.476***

0.477***

(0.000798)

(0.000799)

(0.000800)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; Region and time fixed
effects are included; The baselines are outer boroughs in NYC
(Column 2) and low-income areas (Column 3), respectively. * p<0.05, **
p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Column 1 shows that Uber and taxis compete with
each other by cannibalizing the other demand. The
impact of Uber on overall taxi market is significantly
negative, and the 10% increase in Uber pickups leads to
the 0.12% decrease in overall taxi pickups, accepting the
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the Uber pickups
decrease by 0.31% as the taxi pickups increase by 10%.

To explore the contingent effects upon marketsegments, we extend the baseline model by including
interaction terms between focal independent variables
(e.g., ln 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and dummy variables of borough and
income level. We obtain data about average household
income for each zip code from U.S. Census Bureau. We
code a binary variable, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, as 1 if the zip code
areas belong to that borough. In addition, we categorize
zip code areas into three groups based on income
distribution in NYC; 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as zip
code areas which reside between the 25th ($60,564) and
75th ($99,142) percentile of household income; and the
remaining areas with higher and lower income are
assigned into 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
respectively. Note that the baselines are outer boroughs
in NYC and low-income areas, respectively.
Similarly to main terms, the interaction terms may
be endogenous. For instance, the Uber transactions are
endogenous in both Manhattan and outer boroughs in
NYC, thus we need to address the endegeneity of
interaction term. In the prior literature [5, 29], it is
widely accepted to instrument interactions of
endogenous variables with interactions with instruments.
Following this approach, instead of using the interaction
terms that may be endogenous , we reestimate the model
by including the interaction terms with instruments.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 provide intriguing
findings that the Uber’s impacts on taxi demand are
contingent upon borough and income level. In Column
2, the impact of Uber on taxis in Manhattan is significant,
but not in outer boroughs, supporting the Hypothesis 2.
In Manhattan, the 10% increase in Uber pickups leads
to the 0.14% decrease in taxi pickups. On the other hand,
the impact of Uber on taxi market in low-income areas
is insignificant and negligible (Column 3), whereas its
impact is negatively significant in middle- and highincome areas, supporting the Hypothesis 3. When the
Uber pickups increase by 10%, taxi pickups decrease by
0.17% in higher-income areas.

5.2. Customer-segment analysis
In order to investigate whether the effects of Uber
vary depending on the characteristics of taxi customers,
we split the taxi transactions based on its attributes: tip
percentage, group ride, and payment method (see Table
1 for summary statistics). Specifically, all taxi
transactions whose ratio of tip to total fare (tip
percentage) is above median are divided into large tip
segment, or else into small tip segment. Also, all taxi
transactions whose number of passenger, reported by
drivers, is two or more are classified into group-ride
segment, whose number of passenger is one is classified
into single-ride segment. Cash and credit card segments
are classified by payment for each taxi transactions.
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Table 3. Results of customer-segment analysis
Cash vs. Credit Card (H4)
(1)

(2)

ln(Taxi_Cash)

ln(Taxi_Card)

DV:
ln(Uber)
ln(Taxi) (t-1)
ln(Taxi) (t-168)
DV:
ln(Taxi)_each
subsample
ln(Uber) (t-1)
ln(Uber) (t-168)

Small Tip vs. Large Tip (H5)
(3)

Group vs. Single (H6)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ln(Taxi_

ln(Taxi_

ln(Taxi_

ln(Taxi_

Small tip)

Large tip)

Group ride)

Single ride)

-0.0217***

-0.0164***

-0.0187***

-0.0168***

-0.0296***

-0.0117***

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

0.362***

0.368***

0.362***

0.372***

0.363***

0.372***

(0.000980)

(0.000967)

(0.000978)

(0.000961)

(0.000979)

(0.000967)

0.407***

0.417***

0.410***

0.424***

0.406***

0.415***

(0.000979)

(0.000967)

(0.000977)

(0.000960)

(0.000980)

(0.000965)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

ln(Uber)

-0.0363***

-0.0376***

-0.0346***

-0.0392***

-0.0371***

-0.0351***

(0.0013)

(0.0013)

(0.0013)

(0.0013)

(0.0013)

(0.0013)

0.446***

0.446***

0.446***

0.446***

0.445***

0.447***

(0.000792)

(0.000792)

(0.000792)

(0.000792)

(0.000794)

(0.000791)

0.477***

0.477***

0.477***

0.477***

0.477***

0.477***

(0.000800)

(0.000799)

(0.000799)

(0.000799)

(0.000801)

(0.000799)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; Region and time fixed effects are included; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

We estimate the contingent effects of customersegment by regressing different transactions of taxi,
separately, on Uber transactions. Table 3 reports our
estimation results for the impacts of Uber on each
customer segment. As shown in Columns 1 and 2, Uber
seems to take more the demand of taxi customers who
pay by cash than credit card, accepting Hypothesis 4.
The 10% increase of Uber transactions causes the 0.22%
and 0.16% decrease in taxi transactions whose payment
method is cash and credit card, respectively, implying
that the cashless payment of Uber is perceived as an
important relative advantage over taxis. In Columns 3
and 4, the negative impact of Uber on the taxi
transactions with a small tip is significantly larger than
those who pay a large tip (p < 0.05), as consistent with
the Hypothesis 5. The 10% increase of Uber transactions
leads to the 0.19% and 0.17% decrease in taxi pickup
transactions with a large and small tip percentage,
respectively. Thus, these results imply that ride-sharing
services take more the demand of taxi customers who
are more price-sensitive, due to Uber’s no-tipping
policy.
In Columns 5 and 6, we can accept the Hypothesis 7,
as the demand elasticity of Uber for group taxi rides is
more than twice as large as for single taxi rides. The 10%
increase of Uber transactions is associated with the 0.30%
and 0.12% decrease in group taxi ride and single taxi
ride, respectively. The large difference between group
and single taxi ride implies that perceived risk may play
a critical role in customers’ attitude to new IT-enabled
services and P2P-based sharing economy.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
This study provides intriguing and encouraging
findings of societal benefits of ride-sharing. Our
findings demonstrated that the negative effect of Uber
on taxi demand seems to be mainly driven by Manhattan
and high-income areas, where most taxis are
concentrated, although the Uber’s impact is
insignificant in the outskirts (outer boroughs) and lowincome areas. The suburbs and low-income areas have
been underserved by public transits and street-hail
transportations [11, 34], possibly undermining the
quality of life and social welfare. Figure 3 shows the
trends of Uber transactions by income level during the
sample period. The growth of Uber pickups is more
evident in middle- and low-income areas, and the
percentage of Uber transactions there has increased over
time, contrary to taxis. Thus, our findings highlight that
ride-sharing services can be effective in expanding
transportation options in these underserved markets,
without cannibalizing the demand for taxis there.
This paper offers important contributions and
implications to literature and practice. First, this study
can contribute to the nascent literature on societal
impacts of sharing economy. The availability of ridesharing can reduce the likelihood of alcohol-related
motor vehicle fatalities [22] and also can reduce traffic
congestion and excess fuel consumption [30]. Our work
extends the evidence of the societal impacts of sharing
economy by documenting the relationship between ridesharing and the incumbent taxi industry.
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including short-term and long-term effects, on taxi
industry might be broader and greater than our estimates.
Second, since NYC is one of the world’s largest
cities and hosts many ride-sharing drivers, the effects of
ride-sharing there might differ from those in other cities.
In addition, different regulations for ride-sharing might
affect their competitive relationship. Future studies
could extend our empirical findings to other contexts,
such as other cities and other countries.
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